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Case Note
Measuring Language Rights Along a Spectrum
Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484 (1lth Cir. 1999), cert. granted sub nom.
Alexander v. Sandoval, 68 U.S.L.W. 3749 (U.S. Sept. 26, 2000) (No. 99-
1908).
With the growth of the American Latino and Asian populations during
the past decade,' questions regarding the legality and societal desirability of
English-only measures must soon be resolved at the highest levels of
government.' Public officials will inevitably make determinations
concerning the extent to which individuals possess the right to
communicate in their language of best ability.' The politically charged
discourse over language rights may change direction as a result of the
Eleventh Circuit's decision in Sandoval v. Hagan.4 In this case, the court
struck down the State of Alabama's English-only driver's license
examination because it violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The decision represents a tangible step forward in the protection of
language minority groups. Using Sandoval as a point of departure, this Case
Note argues that a more functional approach to language discrimination
1. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, from 1990 to 2000, the nation's Asian and Pacific
Islander population increased over 49% to reach 11.16 million, while the Hispanic population increased
nearly 50% to reach 32.44 million. See POPULATION DIV., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RESIDENT
POPULATION ESTIMATES OF THE UNTrED STATES BY SEX, RACE, AND HISPANIC ORIGIN,
httpJ/www.census.gov/population/estimates/nation/intfile3-I.txt (Aug. 25, 2000).
2. As of April 2000, half of the fifty states had enacted English-only laws, though the impact
of each statute has varied. Katherine Kapos, Ed. Board Demurs on English-Only, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Apr. 12, 2000, at B1, available at 2000 WL 3757810.
3. While there is presently no entitlement to language rights, remedial English programs
establish a limited right for members of language minority groups. Carol Schmid, Comment,
Language Rights and the Legal Status of English-Only Laws in the Public and Private Sector, 20
N.C. CENT. L.J. 65, 90 (1992).
4. 197 F.3d 484 (1 th Cir. 1999), cert. granted sub nom. Alexander v. Sandoval, 68 U.S.L.W.
3749 (U.S. Sept. 26, 2000) (No. 99-1908). The Supreme Court granted certiorari on grounds not
relevant to this Case Note.
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requires a judicial incorporation of the widely accepted notion of a
language spectrum.
I
In 1990, the citizens of Alabama ratified an English-only referendum,
thereby declaring English Alabama's official language.' One year later, the
Alabama State Department of Transportation adopted a policy mandating
that every part of the driver's license examination, most notably the written
portion, be administered only in English. In September 1997, Martha
Sandoval was named a representative of a plaintiff class consisting of "all
legal residents of the State of Alabama who are otherwise qualified to
obtain a... private vehicle driver's license but cannot do so because they
are not sufficiently fluent in English." 7 After finding adverse economic
impact, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama held that
the English-only driver's license examination was invalid under Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.8
On appeal, the State contended that as a matter of law, an English-only
language policy could never have a disparate impact in violation of Title
VI's protection against national-origin discrimination. 9 Disagreeing with
this contention, Judge Marcus affirmed all of the lower court's findings of
law. The court conceded that "existent case law is unclear" on whether
language serves as a proxy for national origin for civil rights purposes."0 To
that end, the Eleventh Circuit argued that the issue of whether language
serves as such a proxy was "tangential" because this case did not involve a
showing of intentional discrimination." Nevertheless, by affirming the
finding of disparate impact on non-English speakers, the appellate court
effectively legitimated the nexus between language and national origin. 2 In
so doing, the Eleventh Circuit became one of only two federal circuit courts
to nullify a state-sanctioned English-only provision, and the first court to do
so using Title VI.' 3
5. Id. at 488.
6. d.
7. Id. (quoting the district court's class certification order of October 17, 1997).
8. Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1264 (M.D. Ala. 1998). Title VI prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin in all programs receiving federal
funding. 42 U.S.C § 2000(d) (1994).
9. Sandoval, 197 F.3d at 508.
10. Id. at 509.
11. Id.
12. The court alludes to this in dicta: "[Bloth Supreme Court precedent and longstanding
congressional provisions have repeatedly instructed state entities for decades that a nexus exists
between language and national origin." Id. at 510.
13. In Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 931-34 (9th Cir. 1995) (en
bane), vacated as moot and remanded, 520 U.S. 43 (1997), a statute mandating that all
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Like most language discrimination claims, 4 the claimants' strategy in
Sandoval was based on a disparate impact theory of discrimination.
Plaintiffs have typically fallen short in their efforts to establish that English-
only rules have a disparate impact on language minority groups. The two
most influential cases regarding disparate impact, the Fifth Circuit's Garcia
v. Gloor s and the Ninth Circuit's Garcia v. Spun Steak Co.,' 6 both
concluded that workplace language restrictions did not a have disparate
impact on Spanish-speaking plaintiffs. 17 These claims were dismissed
because both courts relied on the same premise: "[TIhe language a person
who is multi-lingual elects to speak at a particular time.. . is a matter of
choice." '" Sandoval, standing for the proposition that English-only
provisions have a disparate impact under national origin laws, stands apart
from these decisions.
Although the direct outcome of Sandoval is unequivocally positive for
a number of language minorities seeking driver's licenses in the State of
Alabama, civil rights lawyers reading the opinion will inevitably realize
that this case will not become a bedrock for the vindication of language
rights. The court of appeals, faced with a factual scenario ripe for an
extension of basic rights for all language minorities, 9 chose instead to
retain much of the reasoning prevalent in the opinions of its sister circuits.
While it did implicitly recognize the connection between language and
national origin, which is a position significantly more consistent with
linguistic studies than the findings of other courts have been,2" the Sandoval
court's passive acceptance of the Ninth and Fifth Circuits' decisions
suggests that bilingual persons will continue to have uncertain claims for
relief under the civil rights laws.
government officials "act" only in English was found to violate the First Amendment because the
English-only provision was facially overbroad, thus abridging free expression.
14. E.g., Schmid, supra note 3, at 80.
15. 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980).
16. 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993).
17. Given that Sandoval was decided in the context of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, it may cause concern that most language cases concern workplace discrimination, thus
falling under the ambit of Title VII. However, this Case Note assumes arguendo that the term
.national origin," found in both titles, has been treated in effectively the same fashion by courts
evaluating the merits of cases dealing with federally funded programs and in the workplace. As an
example of the interchangeable use of the two provisions, the Eleventh Circuit has explicitly
applied Title VnI's disparate impact framework to Title VI disparate impact suits. Sandoval,
197 F.3d at 507 (citing cases).
18. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487 (quoting Gloor, 618 F.2d at 270). Although the Ninth
Circuit, in Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated, 490 U.S. 1016
(1989), struck down an English-only provision on national origin grounds, the precedential value
of Gutierrez is minimal because it was decided prior to the Spun Steak decision.
19. Alabama continued with the appeal despite actual notice from the state attorney general
that the English-only policy violated Title VI. Sandoval, 197 F.3d at 499.
20. Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 1983); Frontera v. Sindell, 522 F.2d
1215, 1219-20 (6th Cir. 1975).
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II
There is a profound connection between language and national origin,
which judges have acknowledged to varying degrees.21 Academics have
also argued that the Spanish language is an intractable part of the Latino
culture, representing one of the ties of Spanish-speaking persons to their
ancestors' or their own place of origin.22 This experience is not limited to
Latinos; the connection is equally strong among other language minority
groups." Ultimately, the absence of strong protections for language
minorities, given the abundance of evidence substantiating the connection
between language and national origin," is cause for concern.
In its decision, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that Gloor and Spun Steak
were "inapposite" because in those cases, the plaintiffs had the ability to
speak English and thus had a viable choice of language.' The court
emphasized that the "vast" majority of the Sandoval plaintiffs were
foreign-born persons who had almost no ability to speak English?6 While it
mentioned that the law had a disparate impact on non-English speakers,"
the court never alluded to the presence of numerous American-born
claimants with inherent language difficulties.
21. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371 (1991) (noting that "language ... should
be treated as a surrogate for race" in some circumstances); Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official
English, 69 F.3d 920, 947-48 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (observing that "language is a close and
meaningful proxy for national origin"); Carino v. Univ. of Okla. Bd. of Regents, 750 F.2d 815,
818-19 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that dismissing an employee because of his accent is actionable
as national origin discrimination).
22. Wendy Olson, The Shame of Speaking Spanish: Cultural Bias in English First
Legislation, 11 CHICANO-LATINO L. REv. 1, 27 (1991); Lisa J. Soto, Note, The Treatment of the
Spanish Language and Latinos in Education in the Southwest, in the Workplace, and in the Jury
Selection Process, 3 HISPANIC L.J. 73, 75 (1997).
23. E.g., Juan F. Perea, English-Only Rules and the Right To Speak One's Primary Language
in the Workplace, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 265, 288 (1990) (discussing the presence of mother
tongues in America, including Spanish, German, Italian, French, Polish, and Yiddish); Edward M.
Chen, Case Note, Garcia v. Spun Steak Co.: Speak-English-Only Rules and the Demise of
Workplace Pluralism, 1 ASIAN L.J. 155, 187 (1994) (mentioning the impact of English-only laws
on Asian-Pacific Islanders).
24. E.g., Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages,
Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269, 359 (1992) (citing EEOC
regulations and statistical findings in support of the nexus between language and national origin);
Aileen Maria Ugalde, Comment, "No Se Habla Espaiol": English-Only Rules in the Workplace,
44 U. MiAMi L. REv. 1209, 1209 (1996) (arguing that a person's place of national origin "almost
invariably dictates" choice of language).
25. Sandoval, 197 F.3d at 499. The court of appeals also attempted to distinguish this case
because it did not involve employment discrimination, which is partly disingenuous considering
that it has openly applied the Title VII analytical scheme to evaluate this and other Title VI
decisions.
26. Id. at 489 (citing Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1283 (M.D. Ala. 1998)). The
court chose two plaintiffs out of hundreds to support its finding. The opinion refers to Martha
Sandoval, a permanent resident from Mexico who understood very little English and was unable
to read English, and Lorenzo Leon, who was also bom in Mexico and was extremely limited in his
ability to speak and understand English. Id. at 490.
27. Id. at 509.
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Under such analysis, the complete "spectrum of language
competence," " a spectrum including countless citizens with multiple levels
of English language comprehension, is left virtually without a claim for
relief. It ranges from "minimal conversation skills to complete fluency in
two languages." 29 William F. Mackey, an expert in the field of linguistics,
reasons that the language spectrum exists because a bilingual person's
ethnic identity never completely disappears just because it assimilates into
the mainstream.3" Supporting this notion, Knapp writes that " [s]ome
Hispanics may be newly arrived immigrants who are only marginally able
to converse in English; some may, having grown up in the United States,
call English their native tongue; and others may find themselves somewhere
in the middle of that broad spectrum." "
Writing on the subject of language minorities, a number of academics
have integrated the language spectrum into their reasoning,32 suggesting
that one's position on the spectrum has a particular influence on a person's
livelihood. This is because a person's primary language remains such
throughout his lifetime. No matter how much many adults try, they are
incapable of learning English at the same level as their primary language. In
this sense, language is, as scholar Juan Perea has observed, a "practically
immutable" characteristic, akin to sex or race.33 As a result, the adverse
implications of language discrimination are quite profound. 4
The idea of linguistic abilities as an all-inclusive spectrum is not
restricted to scholarly articles. The Supreme Court and other federal courts
have relied on the notion of a language spectrum. In Hernandez v. New
York, 35 borrowing from modem commentary studying language aptitude
28. Kiyoko Kamio Knapp, Language Minorities: Forgotten Victims of Discrimination?,
11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 747, 773 (1997). Linguistics studies have long supported this notion of a
language spectrum. E.g., William F. Mackey, The Description of Bilingualism, in READINGS IN
THE SOCIOLOGY OF LANGUAGE 554 (Joshua A. Fishman ed., 1968) (reasoning that the concept of
bilingualism has grown broader as academics have begun to understand that bilingual abilities
function on a spectrum). For more in-depth discussions of language acquisition, see, for example,
ALEJANDRO PORTES & ROBERT L. BACH, LATIN JOURNEY: CUBAN AND MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS
IN THE UNITED STATES (1985); and John H. Schumann, Second Language Acquisition: The
Pidginization Hypothesis, in SECOND LANGUAGE ACQUISITION: A BOOK OF READINGS 256, 256-
71 (Evelyn Marcussen Hatch ed., 1978).
29. Knapp, supra note 28, at 773.
30. Mackey, supra note 28, at 557-68.
31. Knapp, supra note 28, at 762.
32. Id.; Perea, supra note 23, at 292; Lisa L. Behm, Comment, Protecting Linguistic
Minorities Under Title VIP The Need for Judicial Deference to EEOC Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of National Origin, 81 MARQ. L. REv. 569, 595 (1998).
33. See Perea, supra note 23, at 279-87.
34. See Olson, supra note 22, at 27 (arguing that English-only laws place a badge of
inferiority on Spanish-speaking persons).
35. 500 U.S. 352 (1991). Hernandez involved a race-based discrimination claim as opposed
to a national origin claim. The intermingling of race and national origin claims points to the
confusion that occurs when the terms are used as substitutes for one another. Christopher David
Ruiz Cameron, How the Garcia Cousins Lost Their Accents: Understanding the Language of Title
20001
The Yale Law Journal
among persons with both Spanish and English skills, Justice Kennedy
reasoned that the term "bilingual" is "a simple word for a more complex
phenomenon with many distinct categories and subdivisions." "36 Another
federal court has recognized that there is particular variation for degrees of
language fluency.37 These cases indicate that it is possible for judges to
arrive at an understanding of the sociological complexity of bilingualism.
Comparing Gloor and Spun Steak illustrates the vast protection gap that
courts have created in the language cases. At one extreme, national origin
protection is not for the bilingual, that is, according to Gloor and Spun
Steak, those nominally having a choice of language. At the other extreme
lies Sandoval, which permits coverage for those who have no English
abilities whatsoever. The most disconcerting reading of Sandoval would
limit its scope of language protection to only those persons with no English
abilities, leaving outside its ambit the spectrum of partial English speakers.
For these language minorities within the spectrum, whether born in the
United States or not, Sandoval's nexus between language and national
origin offers no solace.
III
Given the need to provide protection to persons along this spectrum of
linguistic abilities, several scholars in the field of language rights conclude
that the text of the civil rights laws should be legislatively altered. It has
been suggested that the statute be amended to incorporate a distinct
category for ethnicity38 or that the law be changed to make language an
explicit subcategory under the national origin rubric.39 Implementing
separate statutory categories for ethnicity and language, although it would
answer the current difficulties associated with not recognizing language as a
spectrum, is quite unlikely to take place, considering the potent political
forces favoring official English laws at both the state and national levels.
VII Decisions Approving English-Only Rules as the Product of Racial Dualism, Latino
Invisibility, and Legal Indeterminacy, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 1347 (1998), criticizes this comingling of
race and national origin, arguing that they should be interpreted as separate entities.
36. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 370. Hernandez recognized the complicated nature of
bilingualism, despite its holding that striking jury members on the basis of their Spanish abilities
was not an equal protection violation.
37. Cota v. Tuscon Police Dep't, 783 F. Supp. 458, 462 (D. Ariz. 1992) ("[N]ot all Hispanics
speak Spanish with the same degree of fluency.").
38. Knapp, supra note 28, at 779-84; Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating
"National Origin" Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 805, 860-61 (1994).
39. Soto, supra note 22, at 75; see also Behm, supra note 32, at 605-06 (proposing a separate
language discrimination act); cf. Stephen M. Cutler, Note, A Trait-Based Approach to National
Origin Claims Under Title VII, 94 YALE L.J. 1164, 1169-76 (1985) (offering a solution focusing
primarily on the protection of ethnic traits).
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Congressional amendment of the civil rights laws may require an upheaval
of political forces that is not foreseeable in the near future.'
Given what is known about language acquisition, a slight adjustment to
the jurisprudential practice of Title VI interpretation would be the
appropriate means to implement the statute as it currently stands. With the
recognition that there exist various levels of linguistic abilities, judges can
reasonably presume that those persons lowest on the spectrum of linguistic
abilities should be afforded greater protection under the law. I call this
proposed model a "sliding scale for the language spectrum." This
methodology would protect language minorities on a sliding scale by
assuming that people with lesser English skills are most in need of
protection from discrimination on the basis of national origin.
Under such a method of judicial analysis, the presumption of protection
would cover persons with limited English proficiency entirely independent
of nation of birth. The incorporation of native-born persons with foreign
ancestry into the fabric of national origin protection is not without
precedent. Supreme Court doctrine, originating in Lau v. Nichols,4 which
held that children of Chinese ancestry had a national origin cause of action
under Title VI, and Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co.,42 which,
reasoning from the legislative history of the civil rights law, stated that
"national origin and ancestry are considered synonymous,"4 3 suggests that
courts have extended and will continue to extend protection to native-born
individuals under the national origin prong of Title VI.
This proposed means of interpretation is quite familiar in federal
jurisprudence, as sliding scales are often employed by courts." Adherence
to a sliding scale continuum is not unfamiliar to legal tradition; it facilitates
a certain relationship to the principle of treating like cases alike in order to
reach a decision that coincides with the rule of law. The Eleventh Circuit's
reasoning in Sandoval, combined with the Fifth and Ninth Circuits'
40. Language minority groups are a classic example of a discrete and insular minority,
according to the rationale of United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
Such minorities lack the political power to sway any vote of the legislature. Cf. Smothers v.
Benitez, 806 F. Supp. 299 (D.P.R. 1992) (citing Carolene Products in a language discrimination
case).
41. 414U.S. 563 (1974).
42. 414 U.S. 86, 88-89 (1973); see also, e.g., Barnett v. Tech. Int'l, Inc., I F. Supp. 2d 572,
577 (E.D. Va. 1998) (quoting Espinoza). Although Espinoza was decided in the employment
context, its holding has similar implications for national origin review under Title VI because the
statutes have been interpreted in a parallel manner in a number of decisions, including Sandoval.
43. Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 89.
44. Courts continue to apply a sliding scale mode of analysis when grappling with a variety
of legal issues in both civil and criminal law. See generally Hodge v. Lynd, 88 F. Supp. 2d 1234,
1243 n.8 (D.N.M. 2000) ("A number of courts and Supreme Court Justices have advocated the
use of a sliding-scale or balancing type of analysis for substantive-due-process cases involving
liberty interests that are constitutionally protected, but do not rise to the level of fundamental
interests deserving the protection of strict scrutiny." ).
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holdings in the other language rights decisions, illustrates a current trend in
national origin jurisprudence. Non-English speakers are afforded protection
by the civil rights statutes while all other parties are flatly excluded. The
significance of this trend is that it treats unlike cases alike, unjustly lumping
fully bilingual persons with those who have only basic communication
skills in secondary languages. Doctrinal integration of a sliding scale into
the language rights decisions would better evaluate the merits of claimants'
cases based on their relative position on the spectrum of linguistic abilities,
assuring fair and certain treatment.
Under this interpretation, an individualized, case-by case determination
of the level of protection would assure that those with English language
difficulties would not be disallowed protection simply because they were
born in the United States. While foreign-born persons with no English
abilities are protected under Sandoval, a sliding scale approach takes one
step forward and applies Title VI to foreign-born and native-born
individuals with minimal English skills. Thus, one's level of language
ability under this system would be a primary determinant of the amount of
protection that one would receive under the national origin prong.
IV
Sandoval is an important decision because it effectively reinforced the
nexus between language and national origin. Understanding that language
discrimination is not limited only to foreign-born individuals requires a
careful reconsideration of what constitutes national origin under the law. A
reasonable next step after Sandoval would be to incorporate the language
spectrum into the fabric of civil rights jurisprudence. The proposed sliding
scale approach would not demand an act of a dilatory Congress or an
upheaval of longstanding case law. Such an approach truly appreciates the
nexus between language and national origin, as well as the existence of a
plethora of individuals along the language spectrum. Conceivably, the
incorporation of the sliding scale for language would extend protection
under the civil rights law to more persons, while at the same time providing
a judge the means to measure the tenability of a plaintiff's civil rights
claims.
-Christian A. Garza
(Vol. 110: 379
